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A Proofs under the fixed budget assumption
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Solving the maximisation problem in (8) of the main article yields the following first order
conditions (henceforth FOC) characterising BˆP and CˆP :
(B) : θux(Bˆ
P + CˆP , 1) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
P )dF (ω) ≤ λˆP ; BˆP ≥ 0
(C) : ux(Bˆ
P + CˆP , 1) ≤ λˆP ; CˆP ≥ 0
(A.1)
The pairs of inequalities hold with complementary slackness and λ denotes the shadow price
of public expenditure. Given that the budget constraint must be exhausted (i.e. B+θC = β),
we now test the following two hypotheses:
(i) BˆP = β, CˆP = 0 (Pure universal system)
If BˆP = β and CˆP = 0 the FOCs in (A.1) become:
θux(β, 1) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, β)dF (ω) = λ
ux(β, 1) ≤ λ
Combining both equations gives the contradictory statement:∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, β)dF (ω) ≥ ux(β, 1)
It cannot hold that the average smvi of the able weakly exceeds that of the unable and so
the assertion that CˆP = 0 must be false. Instead, we must have CˆP > 0. The shadow price
of public expenditure is therefore equal to the smvi for the unable at the optimum.
(ii) BˆP = 0, CˆP = β/θ (Pure targeted system)
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If BˆP = 0 and CˆP = β/θ the FOCs in (A.1) become:
θux
(
β
θ
, 1
)
+ (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, 0)dF (ω) ≤ λ
ux
(
β
θ
, 1
)
= λ
Combining both equations gives:∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, 0)dF (ω) ≤ ux
(
β
θ
, 1
)
The left side is independent of β, whilst the right side is unambiguously decreasing in β.
Further, given that limx→0 ux(x, l) = +∞ it follows from the intermediate value theorem
that there is a critical budget level β¯P satisfying:∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, 0)dF (ω) ≡ ux
(
β¯P
θ
, 1
)

A.2 Proof of Proposition 2a
Solving the maximisation problem in (12) in the main article yields the following FOCs for
the optimal benefits, BˆN and CˆN :
(B) : θ(1− pI)ux(BˆN + CˆN , 1) + (1− θ)pII
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N + CˆN)dF (ω)
+ θpIux(Bˆ
N , 1) + (1− θ)(1− pII)
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N)dF (ω) ≤ λˆN ; BˆN ≥ 0
(A.2)
(C) : θ(1− pI)ux(BˆN + CˆN , 1) + (1− θ)pII
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N + CˆN)dF (ω)
≤ λˆN [θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ] ; CˆN ≥ 0
(A.3)
where the pairs of inequalities hold with complementary slackness.
With regard to the above FOCs, we test the following two hypotheses:
(i) BˆN = β, CˆN = 0 (Pure universal system)
If CˆN = 0 then it must hold from the budget constraint that BˆN = β. In this case, the
FOCs in (A.2) and (A.3) reduce to:
θux(β, 1) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, β)dF (ω) = λ
θ(1− pI)ux(β, 1) + (1− θ)pII
∫∞
0
vM(ω, β)dF (ω)
[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ] ≤ λ
2
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Combining both equations gives:
(1− pI)
[
λ− (1− θ) ∫∞
0
vM(ω, β)dF (ω)
]
+ (1− θ)pII
∫∞
0
vM(ω, β)dF (ω)
[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ] ≤ λ
⇔ (1− pI)(1− θ)
[
λ− ∫∞
0
vM(ω, β)dF (ω)
]
pII(1− θ)
[
λ− ∫∞
0
vM(ω, β)dF (ω)
] ≤ 1
⇔ 1− pI ≤ pII
Given our discriminatory power assumption (i.e. pI + pII ≤ 1) this condition can only hold
with equality, and thus when pI + pII = 1. It follows that Cˆ
N = 0 only if the test awarding
C has no discriminatory power. Otherwise, CˆN > 0 ∀ pI + pII < 1.
It immediately follows from (A.3) that ∀ pI + pII < 1:
θ(1− pI)ux(BˆN + CˆN , 1) + (1− θ)pII
∫∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N + CˆN)dF (ω)
θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII = λˆ
N (A.4)
Substituting (A.4) into (A.2) one can readily show that ∀ pI + pII < 1:
θpIux(Bˆ
N , 1) + (1− θ)(1− pII)
∫∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N)dF (ω)
θpI + (1− θ)(1− pII)
≤λˆN = θ(1− pI)ux(Bˆ
N + CˆN , 1) + (1− θ)pII
∫∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N + CˆN)dF (ω)
θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ; Bˆ
N ≥ 0
(A.5)
where the pairs of inequalities hold with complementary slackness. The left side corresponds
to ϕ¯NNR from the main article, whilst the right side is ϕ¯
N
R .
(ii) BˆN = 0, CˆN = β/[θ(1− pI) + (θ)pII ] (Pure targeted system)
First off, it must hold that BˆN > 0 whenever pI > 0 because limx→0 ux(x, l) = +∞. Suppose
otherwise, then the left side of either (A.5) or (A.2) ‘blows up’ to infinity whenever some
unable individuals have zero income to consume. Next, if pI = 0 but pII ≥ 0 then from
(A.5):
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, 0)dF (ω) ≤
θux
(
β
θ + (1− θ)pII , 1
)
+ (1− θ)pII
∫∞
0
vM
(
ω,
β
θ + (1− θ)pII
)
dF (ω)
θ + (1− θ)pII
The left side is independent of β, whilst the right side is unambiguously decreasing in β.
Suppose that β → 0, then limβ→0 ux(β/[θ + (1 − θ)pII ], 1) = +∞ such that the right side
approaches +∞ and the condition must hold with strict inequality. It once more follows
from the intermediate value theorem that there must be a critical budget level β¯N for which
the condition holds with equality. Formally, β¯N satisfies:
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∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, 0)dF (ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ux
(
β¯P
θ
,1
)
≡
θux
(
β¯N
θ + (1− θ)pII , 1
)
+ (1− θ)pII
∫∞
0
vM
(
ω,
β¯N
θ + (1− θ)pII
)
dF (ω)
θ + (1− θ)pII

A.3 Proof of Proposition 2b
To assist us in deriving the welfare effects of classification errors when pI + pII < 1 we use
(A.5) to derive an ordering of each average smvi at the optimum. Indeed, from the right
side of (A.5) it must hold that:
ux(Bˆ
N + CˆN , 1) ≥ λˆN >
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N + CˆN)dF (ω) (A.6)
where ux(Bˆ
N + CˆN , 1) = λˆ if and only if pII = 0. By diminishing marginal utility of income
we know that ux(Bˆ
N , 1) > ux(Bˆ
N + CˆN , 1) and thus ux(Bˆ
N , 1) > λˆN . Given this, the left
side of (A.5) can only hold if
∫∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N)dF (ω) ≤ λˆN , where ∫∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N)dF (ω) < λˆN
if pI > 0 (because Bˆ
N > 0). Putting this all together we have:
ux(Bˆ
N , 1) > ux(Bˆ
N + CˆN , 1) ≥ λˆN ≥
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N)dF (ω) >
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N + CˆN)dF (ω)
(A.7)
The immediate implication is that the average smvi of unable individuals will exceed that
of able individuals at the optimum whenever classification errors are made.
To proceed, we note the following standard property of concave functions:
ux(B, 1) · C > u(B + C, 1)− u(B, 1) > ux(B + C, 1) · C (A.8)
From (A.7) and (A.8) it must therefore hold that:
∂V N
∂pI
= θ
{[
u(BˆN , 1)− u(BˆN + CˆN , 1)
]
+ λˆN CˆN
}
< θCˆN
[
λˆN − ux(BˆN + CˆN , 1)
]
≤ 0
∂V N
∂pII
= (1− θ)
{∫ ∞
0
[
v(ω, BˆN + CˆN)− v(ω, BˆN)
]
dF (ω)− λˆN CˆN
}
< θCˆN
[∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N)dF (ω)− λˆN
]
≤ 0
(A.9)
where in deriving ∂V N/∂pI and ∂V
N/∂pII we have applied the envelope theorem for con-
strained optimisation. 
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 3a
Solving the optimisation problem in (26) in the main article yields the following FOCs
characterising BˆF and CˆF , respectively:
(B) : [θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)F (ω¯)pII ]ux(BˆF + CˆF , 1) + θpIux(BˆF , 1)
+ (1− θ)
{
(1− pII)
∫ ω¯
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
F )dF (ω) +
∫ ∞
ω¯
vM(ω, Bˆ
F )dF (ω)
}
≤ λˆF
[
1 + (1− θ)f(ω¯)pII ω¯BCˆF
]
; BˆF ≥ 0
(A.10)
and
(C) : ux(Bˆ
F + CˆF , 1) ≤ λˆF
[
1 +
(1− θ)f(ω¯)pII ω¯CCˆF
θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)F (ω¯)pII
]
; CˆF ≥ 0 (A.11)
where the pairs of inequalities hold with complementary slackness and λ is the shadow price
of public expenditure. Note that changes in the integral limits of the welfare function cancel
(an application of the Leibniz rule using the fact that v(ω¯, B) = u(B + C, 1)).
We proceed to test the following two hypotheses:
(i) BˆF = β , CˆF = 0 (Pure universal system):
Suppose that CˆF = 0 - and thus BˆF = β - such that ω¯(β, 0) = ω¯(β). It follows ∀ ω ≤
ω¯(β, 0) = ω¯(β) : H∗(ω, β) = 0 ⇒ v(ω, β) = u(β, 1) ⇒ vM(ω, β) = ux(β, 1). The FOCs
(A.10) and (A.11) therefore become:
[θ + (1− θ)F (ω¯(β))]ux(β, 1) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
ω¯(β)
vM(ω, β)dF (ω) = λ,
ux(β, 1) ≤ λ.
Combining these equations implies the contradictory statement:
1
1− F (ω¯(β))
∫ ∞
ω¯(β)
vM(ω, β)dF (ω) ≥ ux(β, 1)
But the average smvi of those with ω¯(β) < ω cannot exceed the smvi of the unable when
both receive the same unearned income. The assertion that CˆF = 0 must therefore be false.
Instead, it must hold that CˆF > 0 ∀ pI + pII ≤ 1.
An immediate implication of the result that CˆF > 0 ∀ pI + pII ≤ 1 is that (A.11) can be
written with equality and thus as:
ux(Bˆ
F + CˆF , 1) = λˆF
{
1 +
(1− θ)f(ω¯)ω¯CpIICˆF
[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)F (ω¯)pII ]
}
≥ λˆF (A.12)
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Simple rearranging yields:
λˆF =
[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)F (ω¯)pII ]ux(BˆF + CˆF , 1)
[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)F (ω¯)pII ] + (1− θ)f(ω¯)pII ω¯CCˆF
(A.13)
Combining (A.12) with (A.10) gives:
θpIux(Bˆ
F , 1) + (1− θ)
{
(1− pII)
∫ ω¯
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
F )dF (ω) +
∫ ∞
ω¯
vM(ω, Bˆ
F )dF (ω)
}
≤ [θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)F (ω¯)]ux(BˆF + CˆF , 1)
·
{
[θpI + (1− θ)(1− F (ω¯)pII)] + (1− θ)f(ω¯)pII(ω¯B − ω¯C)CˆF
[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)F (ω¯)pII ] + (1− θ)f(ω¯)pII ω¯CCˆF
}
; BˆF ≥ 0
(A.14)
The left side is the aggregate smvi of categorical recipients, ϕFNR. The first term on the right
side the aggregate smvi of categorical recipients, ϕFR, whilst one can readily show that the
second term within curly braces corresponds to −(1 + ∂CF/∂B).
(ii) BˆF = 0, CˆF = CF (0; β, θ, pI , pII)
1 (Pure targeted system):
If pI > 0 then the left side of (A.10)(or A.14) ‘blows up’ to infinity by (1) in the main article
and, consequently, the assertion that BˆF = 0 must be false. However, if pI = 0 then (A.14)
becomes:
(1− θ)
{
(1− pII)
∫ ω¯
0
vM(ω, 0)dF (ω) +
∫ ∞
ω¯
vM(ω, 0)dF (ω)
}
≤[θ + (1− θ)F (ω¯)pII ]ux(CF , 1) ·
{
(1− θ)[1− F (ω¯)pII ] + (1− θ)f(ω¯)pII(ω¯B − ω¯C)CF
[θ + (1− θ)F (ω¯)pII ] + (1− θ)f(ω¯)pII ω¯CCF
}
(A.15)
Whilst the left side is monotonically decreasing in β (because ω¯ increases), the right side
may be non-monotonically changing in β. Consequently, we can cannot in general define a
unique critical budget size below which BˆF = 0 and above which BˆF > 0. This is made
clear through the following numerical example.
Example Let u(x, l) = [αx
1−E
E + (1 − α)l 1−EE ], where E is the elasticity of substitution
between leisure and consumption. Let α = 0.6 and E = 0.5. Also let individual productivities
be exponentially distributed with rate parameter µ = 3. Figure 1 then illustrates how the
left and right sides of (A.14) - i.e. the functions ϕFNR and ϕ
F
R · −(1 + ∂CF/∂B) from the
main text - change with β (we set τ = 0.3, pI = 0, pII = 0.3).

1Where from (19) in the main article the function CF is the level of C that exhausts the budget for any
given B ≤ β (and exogenous parameters).
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Figure 1: Variation of ϕFR · −(1 + ∂CF/∂B) and ϕFNR with β.
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
β
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
ϕFR(0, C
F , ω¯; θ, 0, pII) · −(1 + ∂CF/∂B)
ϕFNR(0, ω¯; θ, pI , pII)
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3b.
To assist in deriving the effect of classification errors on maximum social welfare we note
that from (A.12) we can directly ascertain:
1
F (ω¯)
∫ ω¯
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
F )dF (ω) > ux(Bˆ
F + CˆF , 1) ≥ λˆF > 1
1− F (ω¯)
∫ ∞
ω¯
vM(ω, Bˆ
F )dF (ω)
(A.16)
where ux(Bˆ
F + CˆF , 1) = λˆF if only if pII = 0.
To establish the effect of an increase in the Type I error propensity on maximum social welfare
we use (A.8) - i.e. u(B + C, 1)− u(B, 1) > ux(B + C, 1)C - and (A.16) to obtain:
∂V F
∂pI
= θ〈[u(BˆF , 1)− u(BˆF + CˆF , 1)] + λˆF CˆF 〉
= θ
{
λˆF CˆF −
[
u(BˆF + CˆF , 1)− u(BˆF , 1)
]}
< θCˆF [λˆF − ux(BˆF + CˆF , 1)] ≤ 0
Turning to the effect of Type II errors on maximum social welfare, we have:
∂V F
∂pII
= (1− θ)F (ω¯)J and so ∂V
F
∂pII
> 0 if and only if J > 0 (A.17)
where
J ≡
[
u(BˆF + CˆF , 1)− 1
F (ω¯)
∫ ω¯
0
v(ω, BˆF )dF (ω)
]
− λˆF CˆF (A.18)
=
[
u(BˆF + CˆF , 1)− u(BˆF , 1)− λˆF CˆF
]
− 1
F (ω¯)
∫ ω¯
ω¯(B)
[
v(ω, BˆF )− u(BˆF , 1)
]
dF (ω)
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To transition from the first line to the second line we (i) add and subtract u(BˆF , 1); and
(ii) use the property that v(ω,B) = u(B, 1) ∀ ω ≤ ω¯(B). But since v(ω,B) < v(ω¯, B) =
u(B + C, 1) ∀ ω ∈ [ω¯(B), ω¯) it must hold that:
J > K ≡
〈
1− F (ω¯)− F (ω¯(Bˆ
F ))
F (ω¯)
〉[
u(BˆF + CˆF , 1)− u(BˆF , 1)
]
− λˆF CˆF
=
F [ω¯(BˆF )]
F (ω¯)
[
u(BˆF + CˆF , 1)− u(BˆF , 1)
]
− λˆF CˆF
(A.19)
But we know from (A.8) that u(B + C, 1)− u(B, 1) > ux(B + C, 1)C and so:
K > L ≡ CˆF
{
F [ω¯(BˆF )]
F (ω¯)
ux(Bˆ
F + CˆF , 1)− λˆF
}
(A.20)
= CˆF λˆF
{
F [ω¯(BˆF )]
F (ω¯)
〈
1 +
(1− θ)f(ω¯)ω¯CpIICˆF
θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)F (ω¯)pII
〉
− 1
}
(A.21)
= CˆF λˆF
{
F [ω¯(BˆF )]
F (ω¯)
〈
(1− θ)f(ω¯)ω¯CpIICˆF
θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)F (ω¯)pII
〉
−
[
1− F [ω¯(Bˆ
F )]
F (ω¯)
]}
(A.22)
Note that the transition from (A.20) to (A.21) uses the definition of ux(Bˆ
F + CˆF , 1) from
(A.12), whilst the subsequent transition to (A.22) follows simply from the manipulation of
terms.
It follows directly from terms within the pair of curly braces in (A.22) that a sufficient
condition for maximum social welfare to be increasing in the Type II error propensity is:
E > 0⇒ ∂V
F
∂pII
> 0 (A.23)
where:
E ≡ F [ω¯(Bˆ
F )]
θ(1−pI)
(1−θ)pII + F (ω¯)
· ω¯f(ω¯)
F (ω¯)
· Cˆ
F ω¯C
ω¯
−
[
1− F [ω¯(Bˆ
F )]
F (ω¯)
]
(A.24)
If (1 − θ)pII ≈ 0 then the first term on the right side is approximately zero such that
E < 0. Yet, given that ∂V F/∂pII > (1−θ)F (ω¯)CˆF λˆFE this is insufficient to sign ∂V F/∂pII .
However, if θ(1− pI) ≈ 0 then:
E ≈ F (ω¯(Bˆ
F ))
F (ω¯)
· ω¯f(ω¯)
F (ω¯)
· Cˆ
F ω¯C
ω¯
−
[
1− F (ω¯(Bˆ
F ))
F (ω¯)
]
(A.25)
If the product of (i) the elasticity of F with respect to ω - evaluated at ω¯ - and (ii) the
elasticity of ω¯ with respect to C - evaluated at CˆF - are sufficiently high, then we can
have E > 0 and thus ∂V F/∂pII > 0. Since these elasticities depend on as yet unspecified
properties of the distribution and utility functions respectively, we have enough degrees of
freedom to choose parameters so that E > 0.

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B Proofs for the Optimal Tax Analysis
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1′
Solving the maximisation problem in (33) of the main article yields the following FOCs
characterising the optimal benefits:
(B) : θux(Bˆ
P + CˆP , 1) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
s(n, τˆP , BˆP , λˆP )dF (n) ≤ λˆP ; BˆP ≥ 0 (B.1)
(C) : ux(Bˆ
P + CˆP , 1) ≤ λˆP ; CˆP ≥ 0 (B.2)
where the pairs of inequalities hold with complementary slackness. We test the following
corner solution hypothesis.
CˆP = 0, BˆP > 0 (Pure Universal System)
Setting CˆP = 0 in (B.1) and (B.2) and combining the resulting expressions yields:∫ ∞
0
s(n, τ, B, λ)dF (n) ≥ ux(B, 1)
Given that (i) s(n, τ, B, λ) < vM [ω(n, τ), B] ∀ n > n¯; and (ii) vM [ω(n, τ), B] < ux(B, 1) ∀ n >
n¯, this expression must be a contradiction. The hypothesis that CˆP = 0 is thus false. We
instead have CˆP > 0 and so the optimal benefits are characterised by:∫ ∞
0
s(n, τˆP , BˆP , λˆP )dF (n) ≤ λˆP = ux(BˆP + CˆP , 1) ; BˆP ≥ 0 (B.3)
where the pair of inequalities hold with complementary slackness.
The FOC characterising the optimal tax rate is:
(τ) :
∫ ∞
0
{
y(n, 1− τˆP , BˆP )− nvω[ω(n, τˆ
P ), BˆP ]
λˆP
− τˆP · ∂y(n, 1− τˆ
P , BˆP )
∂(1− τ)
}
dF (n) = 0
(B.4)
Substituting in Roy’s identity (i.e. vω = vMy/n) and the Slutsky-Hicks expression (i.e.
∂y/∂(1− τ) = ∂yc/∂(1− τ) + yMy where yc is compensated earnings) then gives:
τˆP =
∫∞
0
y(n, 1− τˆP , BˆP )
[
λˆP − s(n, τˆP , BˆP , λˆP )
]
dF (n)
λˆP
∫∞
0
∂yc(n, 1− τˆP , BˆP )
∂(1− τ) dF (n)
(B.5)
Letting κ ≡ (λˆP − s¯) - where s¯ ≡ ∫∞
0
sdF (n) - we can write the numerator of (B.5) as (to
save on space we abstract function arguments):∫ ∞
0
y(λˆP − s)dF (n) =
∫ ∞
0
y
[
(λˆP − s¯) + s¯
(
1− s
s¯
)]
dF (n) = κy¯ − Cov(y, s) (B.6)
Substituting (B.6) into (B.5) and subsequently dividing both sides by 1− τˆP then yields the
optimal tax expression in the main article. 
9
Supplementary Online Appendix S.E. Slack & D.Ulph (2016)
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2a′
Solving the maximisation problem in (38) in the main article yields the below expressions
characterising the optimal benefit levels:
(B) : θ(1− pI)ux(BˆN + CˆN , 1) + (1− θ)pII
∫ ∞
0
s(n, τˆN , BˆN + CˆN , λˆN)dF (n)
+ θpIux(Bˆ
N , 1) + (1− θ)(1− pII)
∫ ∞
0
s(n, τˆN , BˆN , λˆN)dF (n)
≤ λˆN ; BˆN ≥ 0
(B.7)
(C) : θ(1− pI)ux(BˆN + CˆN , 1) + (1− θ)pII
∫ ∞
0
s(n, τˆN , BˆN + CˆN , λˆN)dF (n)
≤ λˆN [θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ] ; CˆN ≥ 0
(B.8)
where the pairs of inequalities hold with complementary slackness.
We now proceed to test the following hypothesis:
CˆN = 0, BˆN > 0 (Pure Universal System)
Setting CˆN = 0 in (B.7) and (B.8) gives:
θux(B, 1) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
s(n, τ, B, λ)dF (n) = λ
θ(1− pI)ux(B, 1) + (1− θ)pII
∫ ∞
0
s(n, τ, B, λ)dF (n) ≤ λ[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ]
The first expression implies ux(B, 1) > λ >
∫∞
0
s(n, τ, B, λ)dF (n). Combining both expres-
sions so as to eliminate ux(B, 1) then yields:
(1− pI − pII)
{
λ−
∫ ∞
0
s(n, τ, B, λ)dF (n)
}
≤ 0 (B.9)
Given the discriminatory power assumption of pI + pII ≤ 1, the above condition can only
hold if pI +pII = 1 and thus whenever the test administering C has no discriminatory power.
The assertion that CˆF = 0 must therefore be false whenever pI +pII < 1. Given that Cˆ
F > 0
whenever pI + pII < 1 the optimal choice of benefits is characterised by:
θpIux(Bˆ
N , 1) + (1− θ)(1− pII)
∫∞
0
s(n, τˆN , BˆN , λˆN)dF (n)
θpI + (1− θ)(1− pII)
≤λˆN = θ(1− pI)ux(Bˆ
N + CˆN , 1) + (1− θ)pII
∫∞
0
s(n, τˆN , BˆN + CˆN , λˆN)dF (n)
θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ; Bˆ
N ≥ 0
(B.10)
This is the optimality condition given in the main text (the left side is ϕ¯NNR, whilst the right
side is ϕ¯NR ).
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The FOC characterising the optimal tax rate is:
(τ) :
∫ ∞
0

− 1
λˆN
〈
pIInvω[ω(n, τˆ
N), BˆN + CˆN ] + (1− pII)nvω[ω(n, τˆN), BˆN ]
〉
+pII
〈
y(n, 1− τˆN , BˆN + CˆN)− τˆN · ∂y(n, 1− τˆ
N , BˆN + CˆN)
∂(1− τ)
〉
+(1− pII)
〈
y(n, 1− τˆN , BˆN)− τˆN · ∂y(n,1−τˆN ,BˆN )
∂(1−τ)
〉

dF (n) = 0
(B.11)
Substituting in Roy’s identity and the Slutsky-Hicks equation then gives:∫ ∞
0
pII · y(n, 1− τˆ
N , BˆN + CˆN)
[
λˆN − s(n, τˆN , BˆN + CˆN , λˆN)
]
+(1− pII) · y(n, 1− τˆN , BˆN)
[
λˆN − s(n, τˆN , BˆN , λˆN)
]  dF (n)
=τˆN λˆN
∫ ∞
0
{
pII · ∂y
c(n, 1− τˆN , BˆN + CˆN)
∂(1− τ) + (1− pII) ·
∂yc(n, 1− τˆN , BˆN)
∂(1− τ)
}
dF (n)
(B.12)
From this one can readily establish the optimal tax expression in the main text. 
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2b′
The immediate implication from the right side of (B.10) is that ∀ pI + pII < 1:
ux(Bˆ
N + CˆN , 1) ≥ λˆN >
∫ ∞
0
s(n, τˆN , BˆN + CˆN , λˆN)dF (n) (B.13)
where ux(Bˆ
N + CˆN , 1) = λˆN if and only if pII = 0.
The effect of an increase in the Type I error propensity on maximum social welfare is:
∂V N
∂pI
= θ
{[
u(BˆN , 1)− u(BˆN + CˆN , 1)
]
+ λˆN CˆN
}
< θCˆN
{
λˆN − ux(BˆN + CˆN , 1)
}
< 0
(B.14)
The effect of an increase in the Type II error propensity on maximum social welfare is:
∂V N
∂pII
= (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0

v[ω(n, τˆN), BˆN + CˆN ] + λˆN τˆNy(n, 1− τˆN , BˆN + CˆN)
−
〈
v[ω(n, τˆN), BˆN ] + λˆN τˆNy(n, 1− τˆN , BˆN)
〉
−λˆN CˆN
 dF (n)
(B.15)
= (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
{∫∞
0
[s(n, τˆN , BˆN + CˆN , λˆN)− s(n, τˆN , BˆN , λˆN ]dM
−λˆN CˆN
}
dF (n) (B.16)
< (1− θ)CˆN
{∫ ∞
0
s(n, τˆN , BˆN , λˆN)dF (n)− λˆN
}
≤ 0 (B.17)
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To transition from (B.15) to (B.16) we imposed
∫∞
0
(vM + λτyM)dM = v + λτy, whilst to
transition from (B.16) to (B.17) we used the concavity property in (A.8) coupled with (B.13).
Note that here we make use of the assumption that ∂s/∂M < 0. 
B.4 Full Enforcement Proofs.
Solving the maximisation problem in (42) in the main article yields the below expressions
characterising the optimal benefit levels:
(B) : [θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)F (n¯)pII ]ux(BˆF + CˆF , 1) + θpIux(BˆF , 1)
+ (1− θ)
{∫ ∞
0
s(n, τˆF , BˆF , λˆF )dF (n)− pII
∫ n¯
0
s(n, τˆF , BˆF , λˆF )dF (n)
}
≤ λˆF
{
1 + (1− θ)f(n¯)n¯BpII
[
CˆF + τˆFy(n¯, 1− τˆF , BˆF )
]}
; BˆF ≥ 0
(B.18)
(C) : ux(Bˆ
F + CˆF , 1) ≤ λˆF
1 + (1− θ)f(n¯)pII n¯C
[
CˆF + τˆFy(n¯, 1− τˆF , BˆF )
]
[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)F (n¯)pII ]
 ; CˆF ≥ 0
(B.19)
where the pairs of inequalities hold with complementary slackness. Note that in deriving
these FOCs changes in the limits of integration cancel.
We now proceed to test the following hypothesis:
CˆF = 0, BˆF > 0 (Pure Universal System)
Setting CˆF = 0 in (B.18) and (B.19) and using the fact that n¯(τ, B, 0) = n¯(τ, B) yields:
θux(B, 1) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
s(n, τ, B, λ)dF (n) = λ
ux(B, 1) ≤ λ
The first condition implies that ux(B, 1) > λ, but this contradicts the second condition and
so the assertion that CˆF = 0 must be false. We thus have CˆF > 0 ∀ pI + pII ≤ 1. We can
combine (B.18) and (B.19) - the latter of which now holds with equality - to obtain:
θpIu(Bˆ
F , 1) + (1− θ)
{∫∞
0
s(n, τˆF , BˆF , λˆF )dF (n)− pII
∫ n¯
0
s(n, τˆF , BˆF , λˆF )dF (n)
}
θpI + (1− θ)(1− F (n¯)pII
≤ ux(BˆF + CˆF , 1) ·

1 +
(1− θ)f(n¯)pII [n¯B − n¯C ][CˆF + τˆFy|n=n¯]
[θpI + (1− θ)(1− F (n¯)pII)]
1 +
(1− θ)f(n¯)pII n¯C [CˆF + τˆFy|n=n¯]
[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)F (n¯)pII ]
 ; Bˆ
F ≥ 0
(B.20)
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This is the expression given in the main article (the left side is ϕ¯FNR, whilst the first term on
the right side is ϕ¯FR).
Next, the FOC characterising the optimal tax rate is:
(τ)
∫ ∞
0
{
−nvω[ω(n, τˆF ), BˆF ] + λˆF
[
y(n, 1− τˆF , BˆF )− τˆF · ∂y(n, 1− τˆ
F , BˆF )
∂(1− τ)
]}
dF (n)
− pII
∫ n¯
0
{
−nvω[ω(n, τˆF ), BˆF ] + λˆF
[
y(n, 1− τˆF , BˆF )− τˆF · ∂y(n, 1− τˆ
F , BˆF )
∂(1− τ)
]}
dF (n)
= λˆFf(n¯)pII
∂n¯
∂τ
[
CˆF + τˆFy(n¯, 1− τˆF , BˆF )
]
(B.21)
Substituting Roy’s identity and the Slutsky-Hicks equation into (B.21) and rearranging then
yields:
(τ) :
∫ ∞
0
y(n, 1− τˆF , BˆF )
[
1− s(n, τˆ
F , BˆF , λˆF )
λˆF
]
dF (n)
− pII
{∫ n¯
0
y(n, 1− τˆF , BˆF )
[
1− s(n, τˆ
F , BˆF , λˆF )
λˆF
]
dF (n) + f(n¯)
∂n¯
∂τ
CˆF
}
= τˆF
{∫∞
0
∂yc(n,1−τF ,BˆF )
∂(1−τ) dF (n)− pII
[∫ n¯
0
∂yc(n,1−τF ,BˆF )
∂(1−τ) dF (n) + f(n¯)
∂n¯
∂τ
y(n¯, 1− τˆF , BˆF )
]}
(B.22)
Dividing both sides by 1− τˆF and rearranging then yields the optimal tax expression in the
main text. 
B.5 Proof of Proposition 3b′
To establish the effect of an increase in the Type I error propensity on maximum social
welfare we use the fact that ux(Bˆ
F + CˆF , 1) ≥ λˆF from (B.19) in conjunction with (A.8) to
obtain:
∂V F
∂pI
= θ
{[
u(BˆF , 1)− u(BˆF + CˆF , 1)
]
+ λˆF CˆF
}
< θCˆF
[
λˆF − ux(BˆF + CˆF , 1)
]
< 0
(B.23)
The effect of an increase in the Type II error propensity on maximum social welfare is:
∂V F
∂pII
= (1− θ)F (n¯) · J ; where
J ≡ u(BˆF + CˆF , 1)− 1
F (n¯)
∫ n¯
0
〈
v[ω(n, τˆF ), BˆF ] + λˆF τˆFy(n, 1− τˆF , BˆF )
〉
dF (n)− λˆF CˆF
(B.24)
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Adding and subtracting u(B, 1) and noting that v[ω(n, τ), B] = u(B, 1) ∀ n ≤ n¯ gives:
J = [u(BˆF + CˆF , 1)− u(BˆF , 1)]− λˆF CˆF
− 1
F (n¯)
∫ n¯
n¯
〈
v[ω(n, τˆF ), BˆF ]− u(BˆF , 1) + λˆF τˆFy(n, 1− τˆF , BˆF )
〉
dF (n)
(B.25)
Using the fact that v[ω(n, τ), B] < u(B + C, 1) ∀ n < n¯ it follows immediately that:
J > K ≡ F [n¯(τˆ
F , BˆF ]
F (n¯)
[u(BˆF + CˆF , 1)− u(BˆF , 1)]− λˆF
[
CˆF +
τˆF
F (n¯)
∫ n¯
n¯
y(n, 1− τˆF , BˆF )dF (n)
]
Using (A.8) we then obtain:
K > L ≡ CˆF
{
F [n¯(τˆF , BˆF )]
F (n¯)
ux(Bˆ
F + CˆF , 1)− λˆF
[
1 +
τˆF
CˆFF (n¯)
∫ n¯
n¯
y(n, 1− τˆF , BˆF )dF (n)
]}
Substituting in (B.19) - which holds with equality because CˆF > 0 - yields
L = λˆF CˆF

F [n¯(τˆF ,BˆF ]
F (n¯)
〈
(1− θ)f(n¯)pII n¯C
[
CˆF + τˆFy(n¯, 1− τˆF , BˆF )
]
[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)F (n¯)pII ]
〉
−
〈[
1− F [n¯(τˆF ,BˆF ]
F (n¯)
]
+ 1
F (n¯)
τˆF
CˆF
∫ n¯
n¯
y(n, 1− τˆF , BˆF )dF (n)
〉
 (B.26)
Rearranging the terms in curly braces then yields the sufficient condition for ∂V F/∂pII > 0
provided in the main text. 
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